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Abstract 
This thesis concerns the impact of instrumental benefits and norms on state 
behaviour in international relations. This is studied on the case of the EU’s and 
Japan’s initiation of enforcement against North Korea in the UN Human Rights 
Council, which has garnered increased attention since 2013 when a commission of 
inquiry successfully put the issue on the international community’s agenda.  
I ask why these actors choose to enforce human rights against North Korea, 
and how it is possible for them to do so. To answer this question I develop a 
theoretical framework aimed at developing the research on norm development and 
enforcement. This framework combines a rationalist cost-benefit approach with a 
constructivist approach, and results in five hypothesized relationships. I use 
process-tracing to study official statements made by the actors at meetings in the 
Human Rights Council concerning the North Korean human rights situation, and 
find affirmation on all hypothesized relationships. I find suggestions that indicate 
that the human rights norm’s robustness is an underlying variable constituting the 
actors’ identities and thus guiding their interest to act in a certain way. 
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1 Introduction 
It is now up to the Member States of the United Nations to fulfil [their obligation]. 
The world is now better informed about Korea. It is watching. It will judge us by our 
response. This Commission’s recommendations should not sit on the shelf. 
Contending with the scourges of Nazism, apartheid, the Khmer Rouge and other 
affronts required courage by great nations and ordinary human beings alike. It is 
now your duty to address the scourge of human rights violations and crimes against 
humanity in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  
(Statement by Michael Kirby, chair of the Commission of Inquiry on North Korea, at 
the 25th session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva, 17 March 2014) 
 
Michael Kirby, an expert appointed by the United Nations mentions the duty of 
the UN member states to act against the human rights violations in North Korea. 
Since 1973 the influence of human rights has increased rapidly, with international 
social structures of human rights institutions being built and receiving increased 
power (Risse & Sikkink, 1999:21-22). Human rights are however not 
implemented fully in any part of the world, most notably in North Korea where 
severe human rights violations has been on-going for the last 60 years. So do 
sovereign states feel duty from an inherently anarchical international system, and 
how is that possible? States are often portrayed in international relations as self-
interested utility-maximizers, and enforcing human rights can both be costly and 
harmful. However, in 2013 the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), with the EU 
and Japan in the fore-front, set up the commission of inquiry (COI) to investigate 
the human rights abuses in North Korea. The COI issued an extensive report in 
2014 with detailed indications of crimes against humanity. This led to calls for 
referring the regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC); a call which passed through the UN Human 
Rights Council and the General Assembly, and is now on the table of the Security 
Council. This marks an unprecedented momentum on the DPRK human rights 
issue.  
When the EU and Japan suggested that the Human Rights Council should 
expand its actions taken against the human rights violations in North Korea in 
2013, consequently leading to the elevation of the issue to a new international 
arena, it was after ten years of relative continuity. In 2003 the predecessor to the 
HRC issued its first resolution on the suggestion of the EU, expressing concern 
over the human rights situation in the DPRK, and calling for the North Korean 
government to improve its human rights situation and cooperate with the 
international community (EU, 2003). The following year, the same body set up 
the mandate of the special rapporteur (SR) on the situation of human rights in the 
DPRK, to investigate how the country was complying with its obligations under 
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international human rights instruments. Each following year the mandate has been 
renewed at the proposal of the EU, and from 2008 Japan as well.  
However, the SR had never been granted access to the country nor received 
any greater attention from the DPRK government or the international community. 
When the COI filed their report in 2014, the North Korean government initiated a 
“charm offensive” (Landler, 2014) and several world media outlets, including 
Reuters, Al Jazeera, New York Times and Newsweek, reported on the issue of 
referring the DPRK to the ICC. Undoubtedly, a change occurred when the COI 
report led to the issue of the North Korean human rights violations being put 
permanently on the Security Council agenda.  
Thus, in 2013 “increased action” against the DPRK was clearly called for 
according to the EU (EU, 2013b). The question remains why it was in the interest 
of the EU and Japan to initiate this increased action. No state conform to 
international norms in all aspects of their policies, meaning that defiance of 
human rights norms could not in itself be the only cause of international sanctions 
(Klotz, 1995:4-5). What motivates these specific actors to take on the, most likely 
ungrateful task, of enforcing human rights norm in a country such as North Korea, 
which has shown little regard for the norm?  
The research question for this thesis is: “Why do states enforce norms 
against other states, and how is this possible?”  
Any of the 47 member states in the HRC, but also any of the remaining 
observer states (a total of 192 states in the HRC), can put forward resolutions on 
an issue, even though only member states can vote on and adopt resolutions as 
decision of the council. However, all governments participating in the HRC, no 
matter if they are current members or not, have the possibility to set the agenda of 
the council through debates, negotiations and resolutions. At least one state must 
take the lead on an issue and convince a sufficient number of other states to act 
and support the HRC to take action (Votes Count, n.d. A). Thus it is of interest to 
understand why the EU and Japan specifically are motivated to take this stand in 
exactly this case and at this moment.  
1.1 Research overview 
Why is it fruitful to focus on the dynamic of norms? Firstly, it introduces social 
relations and identity as a variable into the political process, which in the setting 
of meso-level organization analysis can provide insights departing from 
traditional rationalist approaches. After all, states coordinate and cooperate with 
other like-minded states rather than independently deciding their line of action. 
Secondly, norms are, despite a recent surge in research, still not completely 
understood and explained. Norms can affect behaviour due to their enforcement 
but also because people have the expectation of them being enforced. If no 
enforcement and sanctions occurs, people stop expecting punishment and the 
norm eventually fades. Thus, without enforcement there will be no norm. Due to 
enforcement being an essential part of norms, and norms being unique in this way, 
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one must explain why people enforce norms in order to explain norms themselves 
(Horne, 2007:139-140, Horne et al, 2009:200). Our understanding, Klotz claims, 
of the relationship between norms and sanctions remains limited, and hence to 
enhance our understanding of when and why norms matter for sanctions and 
multilateral policies is of crucial importance (1995:6-8).  
Recent research relating to the influence of norms has for the most part 
stemmed from constructivism, arguing that shared ideas and intersubjective 
understandings shapes state behaviour and identity. Klotz, when studying the 
sanctioning of the apartheid-regime in South Africa, notes that her case was 
puzzling for neorealists and similar IR theorists emphasizing the primacy of 
material interests and the difficulty of coordinating multilateral policies (Klotz, 
1995:4-5). She suggests a constructivist/interpretivist approach instead, and 
argues that variations in sanctions policies across different multilateral institutions 
show the importance of both collective interests and procedural rules of the 
institution in question. The institution can empower weak and nonstate actors by 
setting agendas and defining group identities (Klotz, 1995:9-10). 
Martha Finnemore delves deeper into the issue of national interest in 
international society. She argues that the process of defining interests is as 
political and consequential as the pursuit of those interests. Much of international 
politics is about defining rather than defending national interests. Before states 
can pursue their interests, they have to find out what those interests are (1996:ix). 
The assumption of state interests, rather than the problematization of them, is 
dominant within neorealism and neoliberalism, which makes parsimonious 
assumptions about state interests. These interests are assumed to be some 
combination of power, security and wealth. Finnemore does not question these 
assumptions, noting that many states do want these said things. But she questions 
the underlying meaning of these assumptions, and aims to address this silence by 
investigating an international structure of meaning and social value, and not 
power. States are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international 
social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in that 
world (Finnemore, 1996:1-2).  
Consequently, state interests are defined in the context of internationally held 
norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate. This context is 
normative and influences the behaviour of decision makers and mass publics. This 
normative context changes over time; when internationally held norms change, 
coordinated shifts in state interests and behaviour across the system will follow as 
a consequence. States’ redefinitions of interest are thus often not the result of 
external threats or demands by domestic groups, but rather shaped by 
internationally shared norms that structure and give meaning to international 
political life (Finnemore, 1996:2-3).  
Returning back to the issue of norm enforcement, sociology has for a longer 
time studied the influence of norms than political science. The conventional view 
of norm enforcement in this area is a rationalist assumption that argues that norm 
enforcement needs to be explained by identifying factors that overcome individual 
self-interest, since enforcement can be costly, may take time and emotional 
energy and even result in personal harm (Horne, 2007:139-140).  
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Horne et al argues instead for a need to move beyond cost-benefit analyses, 
meaning that explanations of norms might not be as parsimonious as desired. 
There is a need to make only context-specific predictions rather than general ones, 
and one will need to focus on the processes through which shared meanings 
emerge. Both classical instrumentalist, rational factors seem to be important but 
also non-rational factors. Future research on norms should, according to Horne et 
al, thus explore the effects of objective structural conditions, non-instrumental 
factors and the intersection of the two (2009:219-220).  
The combination of these theoretical strands could be boiled down to two 
different kinds of logic of action. Rational choice is often used in theories that 
consider agents and interests unproblematic, and it requires knowledge of utilities 
since one must know what one wants before one can calculate means to those 
ends. An alternative to this notion is that social structures (i.e. norms of behaviour 
and social institutions) can provide states with direction and goals for action. 
Actors conform to the values and rules and roles that the structures define in part 
because of “rational” reasons, but also because they become socialized to accept 
these values, rules and roles. They internalize these roles and rules to which they 
conform because they understand these behaviours to be appropriate and not out 
of conscious choice. This means that actors ask “What am I supposed to do now?” 
rather than “How do I get what I want?”. Thus, notions of duty and obligation 
might govern political behaviour just as self-interest and gain might do so 
(Finnemore, 1996:28-29). The “logic of appropriateness” is driven by social 
structures of norms and rules that govern the kinds of action that will be 
contemplated and taken. The structures also define responsibilities and duties and 
therefore determine who will contemplate and take action. The “logic of 
consequences” in contrast is driven by agents, who are pre-specified and make 
means-ends calculations and devise strategies to maximize utilities. Norms will 
serve the interests of powerful actors (Finnemore, 1996:29).  
The difference between these two logics of action are however not as distinct 
as one portrays them in theory. They are intimately connected, since actors create 
structures which take on a life or their own and in turn shape subsequent action. 
Social structures create and empower actors who may act to overturn structures 
for reasons of their own. In all situations both logics will play a role, so the 
separation of the two is mainly due to analytical clarity rather than an empirical 
reality (Finnemore, 1996:29-30). The explanations based on Horne’s theories 
connected to the cost and frequency of a behaviour are more instrumental and thus 
based on a “logic of consequences”. The explanations based on constructivist 
theories as presented by Klotz below, are tied to social structures and identity and 
thus based on the “logic of appropriateness”. 
This case with these two different actors provides an empirical puzzle that 
seems to be difficult to explain for constructivist or rationalist theories alone. By 
combining the two, and study to what extent shared norms or material aspects has 
lead to the action taken by the EU and Japan towards North Korea, I will develop 
a more comprehensive and pluralistic framework combining approaches in line 
with what is suggested by both Horne, Klotz and Finnemore. 
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1.2 Purpose and research design 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a theoretical framework to understand and 
explain international norm development and enforcement, which I argue to be 
connected. I do so by testing and assessing both causal and constitutive effects 
leading to norm enforcement. I develop a theoretical framework looking at 
interests, arguing that the enforcement of human rights against the DPRK can be 
explained by that it was in the interest of the EU and Japan to stand in the 
forefront of such an initiative, as well as in the interest of the HRC to support it. 
These interests are not taken for granted but problematized, and argued to be a 
result of the social structure the EU and Japan resides within. Whether these 
interests have been the same during the whole time period or whether they have 
changed, thus marking a clear difference with the much more influential COI 
initiative will also be addressed. I thus study both how state interests are formed 
but also how these interests shape state behaviour in the form of norm 
enforcement.  
Several researchers argue that a combination of different theoretical 
perspectives is essential to understand norm enforcement and policy change. 
Horne suggests that a combination of rational instrumental approaches and non-
rational constructivist approaches can account for the most complete explanation 
of why norm enforcement occurs (2009:219-220). Lowndes and Roberts suggests 
it is essential to develop a multi-theoretic perspective from various strands to 
examine the full range of possibilities for actors’ motivation, seeing as how 
traditional institutionalist theories are too inflexible to cope with the mixed 
motivations of states (2013:2, 6). Klotz likewise argues that no absolute 
dichotomy exists between material interests and ethical ideals: “In practice, 
actions are motivated by a complex combination of self-interest […], self-
affirmation […], and group interest” (1995:13). Similarly, Finnemore notes that 
both a cost-benefit calculating “logic of consequences” and a normative “logic of 
appropriateness” are present in the empirical reality (1996:29-30), also suggesting 
that arguing for one or the other is an incomplete representation of reality.  
Thus, at one hand I will use Christine Horne’s instrumental theory. This 
focuses on the cost-benefit calculations made by actors when facing the choice of 
enforcing norms, as well as the impact of social relations in a rationalist 
perspective. Analysing the case of North Korea and the HRC from a rationalist 
assumption only would lead to emphasis on cost-benefit calculations in terms of 
material, rather than social gains and losses. However (as both Horne, Klotz and 
Risse and Sikkink notes) affirming human rights norms can offer important social 
benefits (Klotz, 1995:10). Thus, at the other hand I will use Audie Klotz’s 
constructivist theory. In it, she illuminates the independent role of norms in 
determining actors’ identities and interests. Thus, my aim is to use these two 
theories as complements to each other, rather than competing. By combining the 
two, I will contribute to the development of theory on norm enforcement and a 
more complete understanding of all the mixed motivations that can play a part in 
norm enforcement change and continuation. 
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I will assess the impact of these different theories by turning to the method of 
process-tracing, which revolves around tracing the causes that led to a known 
outcome: in this case the human rights enforcement against the DPRK. George 
and Bennett describes this method as “attempts to empirically establish the 
posited intervening variables and implications that should be true in a case if a 
particular explanation of that case is true” (2005:147). 
However, my theoretical framework builds upon a combination of rationalist 
instrumental arguments and constructivist constitutive ideas. These theories 
regarding norm enforcement are stemming from different epistemological 
backgrounds: positivism and post-positivism. The task to combine these is lined 
with possible pitfalls, but I have already argued for the benefits of a pluralistic 
approach; it will provide us with a much more complete view of the empirical 
reality than just looking at one aspect or another. By differing the theories 
depending on their causal or constitutive effects, arguing that both has an 
influence on the outcome, I will offer a more comprehensive view of causes 
leading an actor to enforce norms. Alexander Wendt argues that the difference 
between “explanation” and “understanding” is not a difference between 
explanation and description, but that both provide explanations and descriptions. 
They just do so by asking different kinds of questions – causal and constitutive 
(1998:102-103). 
1.2.1 Material 
My main source of empirical material will be official statements made by Japan 
and the EU during Human Rights Council sessions between 2008 and 2014. These 
statements include those made during interactive dialogues with the Special 
Rapporteur or the Commission of Inquiry on the DPRK, as well as statements 
made when the resolutions on DPRK has been up for adoption at each council 
session. These documents vary in availability, some only available through the 
recorded webcast of the council, other not at all. But from each session some 
statements have been able to be extracted from both actors, apart from the years 
2006 and 2007. These two years were however dedicated to the setting up of the 
new institution Human Rights Council, replacing the Commission on Human 
Rights, and thus did not include any discussion on the mandate of the SR for 
DPRK or similar. Instead the mandate was renewed in the General Assembly. 
Session 22, 24 and 25 of the HRC (2013 and 2014) are available as recorded 
videos online
1
. Session 19 (2012) of the HRC is available online
2
. Previous 
sessions are not available as recorded videos, but as written statements. These are 
found password-protected at the “HRC extranet”, but where registration to get a 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 Available at: http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/human-rights-council/regular-sessions/ 
2
 Available at: http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/c/nineteenth-session.html 
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general password is available for anyone
3
. The years 2003, 2004 and 2005 was 
during the Commission on Human Rights
4
.  
I have also conducted one interview with a EU-diplomat based in Geneva, 
who provided me with some reflections and thoughts on the process around the 
DPRK resolution. This interview was conducted via Skype, and was of an 
informant-based character. Where the theoretical framework demanded it, I have 
used other source material. 
In 2003 the Commission for Human Rights (CHR) adopted its first resolution 
on the situation for human rights in North Korea, and will mark the starting point 
of my analysis. The end point of the analysis will be when the Human Rights 
Council (HRC) adopted the resolution in 2014 which recommended that the 
General Assembly submitted the report to the Security Council for its 
consideration and appropriate action, in order to ensure that those responsible for 
the human rights violations were held to account to the International Criminal 
Court (Human Rights Council, 2014). When this resolution was adopted the issue 
of North Korea’s human rights compliance moved from one international arena to 
another, namely the UN General Assembly. It then moved on to the agenda of the 
Security Council, where it today has become a fixed point on the council’s 
agenda.  
1.3 Road map 
This thesis proceeds as follows. In chapter 2 I develop my theoretical framework. 
I present my definition and constitution of the norm of human rights, how this 
develops and spreads, and what is believed to underlie the motivations to enforce 
norms. Thereafter I turn to mechanisms of norm enforcement, presenting on one 
hand relationships hypothesizing that costs and benefits motivated by self-interest 
are guiding in states decision to enforce norms. On the other hand I present the 
relationships hypothesizing that self-affirmation and group interest, related to the 
identity of the EU and Japan, guides their interest to enforce human rights in 
North Korea. Thereafter I sum it up in a theoretical framework to be used in the 
analysis, with five hypothesized relationships.  
In chapter 3 I develop my methodological approach in the form of process-
tracing. I explain how I combine the different theoretical strands into a combined 
framework, by introducing the concept of constitution as a difference from 
causality.  
In chapter 4 I apply the theoretical and methodological framework on my 
empirical material, and assess the extent that the different hypothesized 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3
 Register for access at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/HRCRegistration.aspx (or by searching 
for “HRC extranet” at Google) 
4
 Can be found at this address: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/regular-sessions.htm 
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relationships has influenced the EU and Japan’s decision to enforce human rights 
in the DPRK in the context of the HRC.  
I end in chapter 5 with summing up my conclusions and the value added of 
this thesis. I conclude with presenting some suggestions for further research. 
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2 Towards a theoretical framework 
In this chapter I will present the theories underpinning my theoretical framework, 
and sum it up with a number of hypothesized relationships. This framework will 
then be used to analyse the empirical material in combination with the process-
tracing method.  
2.1 Norms 
2.1.1 Definition and origins 
Horne defines norms as rules accompanied by social sanctions, while Klotz 
defines norms as shared understandings of standards of behaviour. Finnemore 
defines norms as shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a 
community of actors. Common for all is that norms are seen as structures 
underpinning social relations. For my purpose, I define norms as a combination; 
norms are shared understandings of standards of behaviour in a community of 
actors, accompanied by enforcement. They thus guide social interaction and 
relations at all levels. 
Klotz notes that there are constitutive and regulative roles for norms. 
Constitutive norms partially define actors’ interests and identities, and are thus a 
crucial part of the international system. As an example, Klotz mentions how states 
exist today due to the socially derived norm of territorial sovereignty, leading all 
states and other international actors to be inherently socially constructed. 
Regulative norms influence policy choices through processes of coercion, 
encouragement and legitimation (1995:16-17, 26-27). In accordance with Klotz 
view, I argue that norms originate from within previously existing social 
institutions, which includes other norms. Thus emerging new norms can be 
analysed from within a context of already established norms. Human rights can be 
argued to have its origin within liberal individualism. Consequently, norms and 
institutions will be stable despite changes in power distributions and actors’ 
interests (1995:21-23).  
2.1.2 Development, spreading and change  
State leaders are not either selfish or social, but both at the same time. A social 
state is required to balance internal notions of interests with each other and also 
the pressures arising from the needs of social approval and a positive self-image. 
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Which of these two prevails depends on the context, and whether the norm is 
robust or not (Shannon, 2000).  
Legro shares this notion and develops the concept of robust norms more. He 
concurs that norms matter, but not necessarily in the ways or extent expected. 
Since norms come in varying strengths rather than just exist or not, the 
constitutive and regulative roles of norms will be stronger if the norm is more 
robust (1997:31, 33).  
The robustness of the norm can be identified by use of three criteria: 
specificity, durability and concordance. Specificity refers to how well the 
guidelines for restraint and use are defined and understood, and is assessed by 
examining actors’ understandings of the simplicity and clarity of the prohibition 
in the norm. Durability concerns how long the rules have been in effect and how 
they tackle challenges to their prohibitions. If norm enforcement occurs, and 
deviants are punished, the norm is reinforced and reproduced. Concordance is an 
issue of how widely accepted the rules are in diplomatic discussions and treaties, 
i.e. to what degree there is an intersubjective agreement on the norm. However, 
reaffirmations of the norm can also be a sign of the weakening of the norm, and 
this can vary depending on the context. By reviewing records of discussions that 
involve the norms, it is possible to see whether states concur on the acceptability 
of the rules and take the rules for granted, or if they put special conditions on their 
acceptance of the prohibitions of the norm or similar (Legro, 1997:34-35). 
The expectation is that the clearer, more durable and widely endorsed a norm 
is, the greater will be its impact on behaviour and actions (Legro, 1997: 35). This 
develops in the norm life cycle, which has three stages; the first one is the norm 
emergence, the second is norm cascade, and the third involves internalization. 
Between the first and second stage is a tipping point, when a critical mass of 
relevant states adopt the norm. Different actors, motives and mechanisms of 
influence characterize change at each stage. The motivation for this second stage 
may vary, and that is what I will continue to delve deeper into in the section on 
norm enforcement. But at this stage socialization, demonstration and 
institutionalization of the norm are the most dominant mechanisms, aimed at 
making norm breakers to become norm followers. If a norm cascade is completed, 
the norm reaches a taken-for-granted quality and is no longer a topic for broad 
public debate (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). 
2.2 Norm enforcement 
Since norms guide social relations by regulating understandings of behaviour and 
sanctions, they work both as constraints and motives. Norms act as a constraint 
when actors comply with the norm, and by determining both appropriate means 
and goals. Thus they indicate what behaviour is seen as legitimate and acceptable 
to do, and indicate an actor’s “duty”. Norms also legitimize goals, thus defining 
actors’ motives or interests and worldview. An actor’s interest is formed out of 
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global processes of norm change (Klotz, 1995:25-26). Thus norms independently 
play a role in determining actors’ interests and identities (1995:17).  
Norm enforcement and sanctioning are here used as synonyms, and in my case 
concerns the negative reactions and punishment that can be brought about by an 
actor’s behaviour. The COI against North Korea is not a material punishment 
unlike traditional economic or material sanctions, but likewise is a punishment 
affecting the state’s reputation and diplomacy.  
What purpose does norm enforcement fill? And consequently, what reason is 
there for an actor to enforce a norm? Kaempfer and Lowenberg notes that 
international economic sanctions do not always play an instrumental role, but can 
also be an expressive goal. Some pressure groups can “obtain utility from taking a 
moral stance against some other nation’s objectionable behaviour” (1988:786). 
Klotz suggests a structural explanation, based on the role of norms as fundaments 
of social relations, behaviour and identity, arguing that two political processes are 
at play characterizing continuity and change. The first process is constitutive, and 
concerns struggles to define the mutual understandings or norms that underpin 
identities, rights, grievances and interests. The other process is instrumental, and 
concerns the use of social sanctions to control behaviour (Klotz, 1995:27). But 
sanctioning also constrains and affirms identity (1995:29), thus also marking 
sanctioning or enforcement as a constitutive process. Due to this constraining 
effect, one can return to the definition of norms and note that norm enforcement is 
inherent in norms themselves. As Horne notes, without enforcement people stop 
expecting punishment or rewarding and thus the norm eventually fades. Without 
sanctioning there will consequently be no norm (2007:139-140). And since the 
same norm underpins actors’ identity, behaviour and interests, they will have an 
incentive to enforce the norm – as a tool to define the norm and thus affirm their 
own identity and interests. This indicates that state interests are supplied 
externally, and that states are receptive to what actions are seen by other actors as 
appropriate and useful, which thus follows the logic of appropriateness 
(Finnemore, 1996:11).  
Costs and benefits also act as reasons for actors to enforce norms. As Horne 
notes, sanctioning can be costly. That norms are enforced despite the costs is 
because the benefits outweigh the costs. These benefits can be driven by 
incentives defined by an actor’s self-interest, meaning that they will enforce 
norms because they want a share of the benefit that the sanctioning will produce 
(Horne, 2007:140-142). With this reasoning, actors will have an interest in the 
sanctioning that regulates behaviour, because they want a share of the benefits 
associated with the sanctioning. The greater that benefit the stronger the interest 
of other group members will be (Horne, 2007:145), which follows a logic of 
consequence.   
Horne’s approaches concern agents being driven by self-interest with rational 
consequentialist logic. Klotz focus rather on normative structures as the driving 
force in norm enforcement, and argues that these structures also underpin actors’ 
interests and self-affirmation (1995:13). In my analysis I will aim at mapping out 
the extent that these components – material self-interest, group interest and self-
affirmation, affect actors’ behaviour and policy choices, or in other words states’ 
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decision to engage in international norm enforcement. I thus place self-affirmation 
and group interest under Klotz’s constructivist view. This provides me with a 
constitutive explanation of the actor’s behaviour. The material self-interest is 
placed under Horne’s instrumental approach, which will provide me with a causal 
explanation. Underpinning all these components are structural norms forming 
actors’ identity and thus also their behaviour and interests. This identity of the 
states is related to human rights to varying degrees, for example some states will 
have a larger interest to be known as human rights “defenders”. This approach 
will by and large provide me with a constructivist explanation, but including 
instrumental rationalist factors as well.  
2.2.1 Self-interest  
Klotz uses material self-interest as a baseline (1995:14), meaning that all actors 
have this at heart when operating. The extent to which group interest and self-
affirmation will affect behaviour and policy choices apart from the self-interest 
will thus vary, and be stronger vis-à-vis self-interest at times and at other times 
not. Horne notes problems with the assumptions of the material self-interest, since 
the empirical reality shows that this rarely can explain all variation (2007:142). 
However, both agree that it can account for at least some variation, thus indicating 
that it can be of some use in combination with other explanatory factors. It is thus 
an issue of identifying possible material costs and benefits that sanctioning will 
produce for the sanctioners, which can also include the benefits provided by the 
metanorms at play.  
Metanorms are norms that regulate enforcement. If states do not punish other 
who deviates from the norm, those states will themselves be punished. Similarly, 
if punishment is carried out of the “deviant” the state will be rewarded for doing 
so. Incentives to reward or punish a sanctioner stems from a wish to receive a 
share of the benefits of sanctioning (thus being dependent on there actually being 
substantial benefits of the sanctioning in the first place) (Horne, 2007:143). 
Metanorms are enforced because actors care about their social relations. They 
have a positive effect on norm enforcement, since people want others to think well 
of them. When an actor makes a decision about sanctioning they will consider the 
reactions of others, because they want to show that they are a “good type” worth 
interacting with and want others to respond to their behaviour in a positive way. 
The stronger and more favourable reactions there are to sanctioning, the more 
likely people are to enforce norms (2007:148).  
This is strongly influenced by rationalist assumptions, which assume that 
actors are utility maximizers. This means that the actor has clearly defined goals 
and objectives (for example national security and territorial sovereignty), and 
when facing a set of alternatives with different consequences will choose the 
alternative whose consequences will give the biggest pay-off and smallest cost 
according to the actor’s set of objectives. The utilitity-maximization implies that 
actors have perfect information and clear alternatives (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999:18, 30-33). 
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2.2.2 Self-affirmation and group interest 
How to identify an actor’s behaviour as motivated by self-affirmation or group 
interest? Klotz introduces three central tools that illustrate how norms affect 
policy choice, in this case the choice to enforce the human rights norm. The 
constitutive, regulative and procedural roles of norms are illustrated with these 
tools. 
Firstly, several international communities exist rather than one, as sites of 
identity and interest formation. Thus the variation in enforcement can be due to 
change in memberships and external norms forming a socio-historical context 
(Klotz, 1995:27). Identity and interests thus depend on this context. This view 
implies that there is no dominant international order. These communities are 
developed out of shared values and interests, and a state may maintain several 
simultaneous community memberships or group identities. Foundational 
principles and collective articulations of threat can be indicators of an identity 
distinct from interests and behaviour, illustrating the constitutive norms that 
define collectivities of actors.  
States may thus remain members of institutional arrangements for identity-
affirming reasons, but also for material gains. These communities prove to be 
crucial arenas in which identities influence actors’ behaviour. Membership offers 
both social costs and benefits, but not solely economic or functional incentives. 
Behaviour will have different meanings depending on the context and the 
legitimation offered. The community standards define how far behaviour can 
diverge from norms, enabling sanctions to work as instruments of socialization 
through identity constraint and identity affirmation (Klotz, 1995:28-29). Thus, an 
international community is not only constraining, but also constitutive and 
generative since it creates new interests and values for actors. By changing state 
preferences it changes state action (Finnemore, 1996:5-6). 
The second tool, the reputations of actors in regards to the norm can give an 
indication of the legitimation processes of norms as well as their constraining 
effects (Klotz, 1995:27-28). Self-affirmation and legitimation is based on the 
prevailing norm, and is therefore not only observable in behaviour but also 
through the process of communication. To analyse the communication process it 
is necessary to study words and intentions as well as behaviour. Intentionality and 
acceptability are central to this, rather than compliance and deviance to a norm 
(Klotz, 1995:30) 
Reputation is relational since it is defined by the opinions of others, and 
normative constraint thus depends on how a deviant is perceived by other 
community members. Specifically it depends on how others have interpreted an 
actor’s actions. A community relationship defines which actors matter: whose 
judgments matter, who the receivers of justifications are and whose sanctions are 
of the most concern to the deviant. Reputation is therefore a source of 
vulnerability and potential constraint on an actor’s ability to achieve its goals. The 
effect of a negative reputation will however vary in seriousness. Some degree of 
deviation from the community standards helps to define those norms. If repeated 
deviation occurs, responses to that will depend partly on the types of norms being 
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flouted and the previous reputation of the deviant. If a state deviates repeatedly or 
extremely from the community standards, it might lead to serious consequences 
such as expulsion from the community. Thus, the norms by which behaviour is 
judged set the boundaries of political conflict and cooperation (1995:30-31). 
Naturally, states cannot determine their own reputations but can try to convey 
a particular image in order to minimize any negative repercussions of community 
criticisms. This can be achieved by being associated with and evaluated through 
the framework of the community’s shared values, thus emphasizing desirable 
traits. Consequently, the community relations of an actor mainly involve the 
control or manipulation of information in attempts to fit into the normative 
frameworks within which other members evaluate its actions. The ability to 
communicate becomes critical for navigating among the constraining effects of 
identity in the form of reputation (Klotz, 1995:31).  
The third tool concerns international and domestic discourse, and also formal 
institutions, which can be examined to trace the impact of norms in the process of 
policy-making (Klotz, 1995:28). This is connected to norms as motives, since it 
links identity and interests to policy and behaviour, and concerns group interest 
rather than self-affirmation. Various avenues exist for norms to influence the 
determination of national interests and political goals through international and 
domestic decision-making processes. These transmission mechanisms include 
multilateral institutional memberships, bilateral persuasion or learning, elite 
changes, domestic coalition building and more dramatic domestic social 
transformation 
Shared norms underlie dominant ideas and knowledge. Individual ideologies 
develop into shared, intersubjective community conceptions of normality and 
deviance through social interaction. This produces relatively consistent 
interpretations of the empirical world among the actors. Norms are guides for 
understanding, and are thus crucial in defining and shaping reactions to the world 
they interpret. By identifying the norms guiding the actions of the states in their 
norm enforcement it can thus explain their behaviour. These intersubjective 
understandings, i.e. the standards by which behaviour is judged, are also essential 
in setting the boundaries of political struggle and cooperation. In other words, 
instead of depending only on individuals’ beliefs or understandings, the policy-
making processes involve shared assumptions about the political process and 
national interests. By focusing on consistencies in assumptions within decision-
making processes one reasserts the importance of shared norms. Variation in the 
permeability of discourse across decision-making institutions can explain why 
organizations and states adopt different types of sanctions and policies (1995:32-
33). 
2.3 Theoretical framework 
So how is this put together? In sum, causal self-interest is identified by looking at 
the material and social benefits that can be gained by states if they choose to 
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enforce the norm. Then constitutive self-affirmation is identified by looking at the 
subsystemic communities of the sanctioners, and the constitutive norms that 
define these collectives of actors. Membership influences the identity of the 
actors, which in turn indicates what behaviour will be seen as self-affirming. 
Thereafter the reputation and communication is looked at, also a step in 
identifying to what extent self-affirmation has played a role. Reputation constrains 
the behaviour of an actor, meaning that in order to communicate a better 
reputation in relation to the prevailing norm in the community, states might 
choose to behave in a certain way; in this case, to enforce a norm. This will affirm 
their identity in relation to the norm. Last, I look at the discourse and constitutive 
group interest; what prevailing discourse or shared assumptions seems dominant 
over time and how can this be seen to affect the policy choice of the institution of 
the HRC and thus affect the group interest?  
These will be boiled down to five hypothetical connections or relations 
summed up below. The first two are causal and will be tested by a traditional 
process tracing hypothesis test. The last three are constitutive in their effects and 
will be explored by a typology of constitutive causation. The aim of these 
relationships is to test the causal and constitutive connection, and with the results 
being able to contribute to development of theory on norm enforcement towards a 
more pluralistic approach. 
 
1. Material benefits cause an actor to enforce norms against another 
2. Social benefits cause an actor to enforce norms against another 
3. Group membership cause an actor to want to enforce norms against 
another 
4. The wish to enhance reputation cause an actor to enforce norms against 
another 
5. Shared norms in the community cause an actor to enforce norms against 
another 
 
While these five connections stem from different theoretical backgrounds they 
will likely be mutually reinforcing and complementary.  
Behind these is however an underlying variable, which is also constitutive. 
This variable is the norm in itself, which have constitutive effects since it makes 
social roles and identities possible. Without the norm of human rights, there 
would be no defined identity for the norm-defending actors or the norm-violating 
actors, thus also not making it possible for the actors to define their self-interest 
and group interest in this situation, nor to make it possible for them to act in a 
self-affirming way. I return to the role of constitutive effects versus causal effects 
in the next chapter, but my aim is to look for observations that can show how the 
norm of human rights makes it possible for actors to enforce norms against others. 
As mentioned, norms guide social interaction and relations at all levels. The more 
robust norm the greater the effect of the norm on actors’ behaviour can one 
expect, and it will similarly have a stronger constitutive effect on the behaviour of 
norm enforcement.  
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3 Method 
In this chapter I will present the method of process-tracing, as well as how I will 
use it with my theoretical framework. Constitutive causality is a central concept 
that enables a combination of rationalist and constructivist theories. 
3.1 Process-tracing 
Process-tracing is a method for identifying the intervening causal process between 
and independent and dependent variable (George & Bennett, 2005:206). It is best 
applied to emphasize change at the meso-level (Kay & Baker, 2015:10). The 
starting point is an awareness of the outcome, and one then studies the process by 
which the outcome happened – not the outcome in itself. One can start by 
studying decisions close in time to the final outcome and then work oneself 
backwards in time (Esaiasson et al, 2010:145). By tracing the process that may 
have led to an outcome one can narrow the list of potential causes. However, it 
may prove difficult to eliminate all potential explanations but one, because when 
human agents are involved they may be trying to conceal causal processes. But 
process-tracing forces a researcher to consider alternative paths through which the 
outcome could have occurred, which makes it an important tool for theory testing 
and development; not only through the generation of numerous observations 
within a single case, but also because of a lack of independence between the 
observations. This makes it necessary to link the observations in particular ways 
to create an explanation of the case and reduces the problem of indeterminacy 
(George & Bennett, 2005:207).  
A theory may not leave observable implications, or its predictions about a 
causal process may be ambiguous or questionable. To prove that a particular 
process did occur can be very difficult, and if the theory is not specified enough it 
might not allow identification of causal processes with confidence. However, at 
least some explanations can be excluded by a single case-study (George & 
Bennett, 2005: 217-218, 220). 
When a well-specified theory is available, the theory testing can work its way 
from effects to their possible causes. All but one theory might not be eliminated 
due to insufficient evidence. The theories might also be complementary rather 
than mutually exclusive and thus several theories may have contributed to the 
observed effect (George & Bennett, 2005:218). 
Kay and Baker identify three types of process-tracing, and I will conduct a 
theory-centric kind. This concerns theory testing, and its purpose is to ask whether 
the mechanism the theory hypothesizes is present in the case, and if this 
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mechanism functions as assumed. This is used since existing theories are 
extracted in my theoretical framework, and since my aim is to test whether these 
mechanisms are present or absent in my case (2015:6-7). However, these 
inferences will be used in order to develop theory as well, and I will combine 
them with constitutive inferences. 
3.1.1 How to do theory-centric process-tracing  
In my theoretical framework I have mapped out different potential mechanisms 
that could bring about norm enforcement. This is the first step in a process-tracing 
approach according to Kay and Baker, and they also press the point of using 
counterfactual hypotheses as well (2015:10). In my analysis I will include 
considerations of relevant null hypotheses. The second step is to collect diagnostic 
evidence, which can indicate whether the image of the world implied by the 
theory is consistent with multiple actions and statements of the actors at each 
stage of the causal process. The observations are not necessarily actual 
manifestations of a variable but can rather be indicators or markers of its existence 
(Kay and Baker, 2015:12).  
However, these observations are not all necessarily equally important to the 
outcome, and it is necessary to assess its diagnostic weight. This is done by 
considering the frequency of the observations, whether an observation would 
likely occur if alternative explanations would be true, and assessing the 
spuriousness of the observation (Kay & Baker, 2015:13).  
The weighting assigned to pieces of evidence should be determined in relation 
to the nature of its source. If it is primary evidence it is created during the time 
period under analysis and has not been subjected to scientific interpretation. This 
includes speeches, media articles and policy documents among others. These 
types of evidence are what I will mainly be using, and should be used to reflexive 
inquiry: who, for whom, where, when and why was the evidence created and how 
do these factors insinuate bias? Secondary evidence is interpretations of primary 
evidence created after the time period under analysis, like historic accounts and 
key informant interviews (Kay & Baker, 2015:13-14).  
The third and last step in the process tracing analysis is hypotheses testing. 
This can be done by the use of four tests based on the degree of belief in a 
hypothesis (Kay & Baker, 2015:15). The more unexpected a piece of evidence is, 
i.e. the more unique it is, the greater a hypothesis’ affirming power. This means 
that one has to formulate the expectations one has to find confirmation in 
observations of the hypothesis, which I will do in the analysis.  
Below is a table from Rohlfing (2014:611) illustrating the tests out of their 
uniqueness/sufficiency and certainty/necessity. He defines certainty/necessity as 
the probability with which one expects to find an observable implication 
confirmed (something assessed before the analysis), and uniqueness/sufficiency as 
whether the observation is specific to one explanation or can be derived from 
multiple hypotheses (2014:610). 
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The tests can be used to determine whether something actually took place, but 
also whether an independent variable was the cause of the dependent variable 
(Kay & Baker, 2015:15). The four tests are: a doubly decisive test, a smoking gun, 
a hoop test and a straw-in-the-wind, and are dependent on the available material. 
A doubly decisive test is the strongest, confirming a hypothesis and eliminating 
others. It requires an observation to be both necessary and sufficient. A smoking 
gun test is a strong sufficiency test, when evidence is sufficient but not necessary 
to support the presence of a causal factor or the operation of its mechanism. With 
this, one can confirm a hypothesis, but the absence of such evidence does not 
eliminate that hypothesis. If multiple causes are necessary for the same outcome, 
the rarest of those causes is the most important empirically. The third test, a hoop 
test, is a strong necessity test. If necessary evidence is absent one can eliminate 
the hypothesis, but if it is present it can establish the importance of it but does not 
confirm it. The straw-in-the-wind test finally is the weakest, and applied when 
evidence may have some probative value to the hypothesis but is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to affirm or reject the hypothesis. It supplies leverage for 
or against a hypothesis (Kay & Baker, 2015:16).  
These tests may not be possible to conduct robustly due to possible 
spuriousness of evidence and the complexity of policy phenomena. This 
challenge, that it might never be possible to completely eliminate nor affirm a 
hypothesis, can be solved by adhering to Rohlfing’s claim that we should test each 
argument comparatively in terms of their relative explanatory power, rather than 
competitively. Theoretical pluralism suggests that it is useful to include multiple 
explanatory factors in a research design since independent variables marking 
separate theories will often correlate to some extent. This type of comparative 
hypothesis testing recognizes that the policy processes are complex in which 
causal factors and mechanisms are context dependent and can interact with one 
another to generate nonlinear effects (2015:16-17).  
3.2 Causality and constitution 
My theoretical framework poses answers to two kinds of questions: causal and 
constitutive. I ask both why Japan and the EU chooses to enforce human rights 
Table 1. Rohlfing’s “Types of Hypothesis Tests and Causal Inference” 
  Certainty (passing test is necessary for 
inferring causation) 
Uniqueness 
(passing test is 
sufficient for 
inferring 
causation) 
 High (Yes) Low (No) 
High 
(Yes) 
Doubly decisive Smoking 
gun 
Low 
(No) 
Hoop Straw-in-
the-wind 
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against North Korea in the HRC, and argue that it might be explained by 
motivations based on self-interest. But I also ask how is it possible for them to do 
this - what social structures underlie the norm enforcement, making one state want 
to sanction another for human rights violations?  
Causal theories answer “why?” and “how?” questions. To answer such causal 
questions, i.e. by finding that X causes Y, three assumptions are made: 1) X and Y 
exist independent of each other, 2) X precedes Y in time, and 3) without X, Y 
would not occur. It is mainly the third counterfactual assumption posing 
challenges to causal theories, since these cannot be observed. But constitutive 
questions do not make the two first assumptions, because these two reflect the aim 
to explain change in the phenomena being studied. Causal theories can thus be 
called transition theories (Wendt, 1998:102).  
Constitutive theories account for the properties of things by reference to the 
structures of which they exist, and can thus be called property theories. These are 
static rather than explaining events through time. The structures can contain 
dynamic properties, being continually reproduced through time even if they do not 
change, but the theory will only aim at taking a static snapshot to explain how the 
structure is constituted. The constitutive question is “how are things in the world 
put together so that they have the properties that they do?”, or “how is it possible 
for A to do B”. A constitutive theory needs to fulfil the counterfactual third 
assumption made in causal theories, but do not adhere to the first two since it does 
not concern change. When the properties constituting a phenomenon come into 
being, the phenomena come into being with them at the same time. Talking about 
independent and dependent variables in this context thus makes no sense in the 
traditional sense, but can be interpreted differently in that case; when constituting 
conditions vary, then so do their constitutive effects by definition (Wendt, 
1998:103, 105-106). Constitutive theories are however not causal, but still provide 
an explanation of a phenomenon (Wendt, 1998:110). 
The distinction between a claimed positivist explanation and post-positivist 
understanding is commonly made in social science, arguing that these are 
fundamentally different. The argument is that the goal when explaining a 
phenomenon is to find causal mechanisms and social laws. The goal of 
understanding is to recover the individual and shared meaning that motivated 
actors to do what they did. As Alexander Wendt argues, the difference between 
these can be seen not as a difference between explanation and description, but 
between explanations that answer different kinds of questions – causal and 
constitutive. Thus the difference is rather relating to the type of questions one 
asks, but both provide explanations (1998:102-103). 
Both constitutive and causal theories imply a similar epistemology since they 
both are true or false in relation to how they correspond to the state of the world, 
because both are guided by a desire to make the theories correspond to how the 
world works. Both also provide both description and explanation. Ideas or norms 
have constitutive effects since they make social roles and identities possible. 
Those shared understandings also have causal effects on the actors by motivating 
and generating their behaviour (Wendt, 1998:106-107, 117).  
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This is what is central to bridging the gap between the theoretical strands in 
my approach. My theoretical framework identifies material aspects to have causal 
effects, i.e. leading to change, but ideas to have constitutive effects, in other words 
defining properties of a structure. I believe self-affirmation, self-interest and 
group interest to all have effects on norm enforcement. Or in other words, if these 
three aspects are absent an actor will not have the motivation to enforce norms 
against other actors who deviate. However, I do not stop there, since the norm 
being enforced also constitutes a structure for the actors to act within. This means 
that self-affirmation, self-interest and group interest do not exist independently of 
the norm, which constitutes the social structure the actors behave and act in, i.e. 
the meso-level institutional context of the HRC and its constitutive norms. 
Constitution, or the properties of the social structure that the actors are situated in, 
thus also provides an explanation as to why norm enforcement occurs. By 
combining both constitution and causation they can provide complementary 
explanations, rather than competing ones. By applying this softer causality one 
can abandon the search for general laws partially, and focus on clarifying the 
meaning of the causal process (Björkdahl, 2002:12).  
So while I will study causality in the traditional sense as defined by Wendt, I 
will go deeper to also clarify the meaning or the properties of the process. This 
will provide me with an explanation that is context-specific. Process-tracing 
applied to within-case studies can only claim cause-effect relationships to that 
case only. While a mechanism can operate the same way under different contexts, 
they cannot alone cause outcomes. Causation resides in the interaction between 
the mechanism and the context within which it operates (Kay & Baker, 2015:5, 7). 
Many positivists would agree upon this view that causation and constitution 
are two different things. But several constructivists have touched upon a more 
combined view of causality. It is suggested that constitutive causality occurs 
whenever “antecedent conditions, events, or actions are ‘significant’ in producing 
or influencing an effect, result, or consequence” (Lebow, 2009:213). However, it 
seems like neither Wendt would disagree that constitution can have effects or 
consequences, but simply that they just do not bring about causal effects in the 
strictest sense as defined by the three assumptions mentioned above. As Lebow 
argues, “constitutive causality” offers no X that causes Y. Hypothesised causes 
are not claimed to be necessary or sufficient, and in its strongest form constitutive 
causality theorises conditions that can pass hoop tests at the most. Weaker forms 
of causal claims offer possible and insufficient conditions. To identify all causes 
will never be possible, but Lebow argues that this is not necessary to develop a 
reasonable understanding of the behaviour in question (2009:214-215).  
Lebow provides a useful tool to assess the effects of constitution, or the 
constitutive causality as he puts it. I adhere to Wendt’s definition that this is not 
causality in its strictest sense, but that this type of constitutive effects still 
provides a good explanation that can have causal effects, as noted above. Thus, 
constitution can cause effects. Lebow describes a continuum with strong forms of 
constitutive “causality” on one end and weak forms at the other (2009:211). The 
high end with strong forms of causation has frames of reference that make some 
behaviour all but necessary and some almost inconceivable. In the middle of the 
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continuum are frames of reference that make some behaviour more likely and 
other actions correspondingly less so. At the low end with weak “causality” are 
identities and frames of reference that have little effect on actors’ behaviour, but 
however can be used by the actors to help sell or justify particular behaviour or 
policies (Lebow, 2009:215).  
A strong constitutive causality mainly include religious beliefs, where it can 
be possible to demonstrate that the behaviour in question would be inconsistent 
with other identities and frames (a null-hypothesis of a sort) (Lebow, 2009:215-
216). The middle range strength of constitutive causality can however include 
social and political identities, which will make some behaviour more likely and 
other actions less likely. Weaker constitutive causality is often associated with 
frames of reference that are less determining, meaning that a behaviour being 
analysed can be consistent with multiple identities or frames. In other words, to 
explain the behaviour through its constitution several explanations relating to 
properties might be true, thus being insufficient. Lebow suggests that this is the 
most common situation since actors almost always have multiple frames of 
reference. Chance, confluence and other contextual features may determine why 
any of these come to the fore at a certain point, which makes it essential to situate 
any inquiry in a broader social and causal context. At the lowest end of the 
continuum are identities and frames of reference that are used as rhetorical 
devices to justify behaviour and policies. Lebow mentions “Western civilization” 
and “sovereignty” as two examples which both divided actors into “us” and 
“others” (2009:217-218).  
Lebow suggests that one studies how actors formulate their appeals in order to 
identify where exactly on the continuum an observation is situated. If actors 
attempt to “sell” the frames they are at the low end, if they try to appeal to the 
frames they are at the middle end, and if they make no reference to them but still 
act and speak in terms of them they are at the high end (2009:219).  
3.3 Methodological framework 
How do I then actually combine all these components into the actual method to be 
used in my analysis? The aim is to evaluate the causal and constitutive causes 
leading Japan and EU to enforce human rights against the DPRK. I will start with 
the three steps presented by Kay and Baker, but add additional steps in order to 
include consideration of the constitutive effects.  
The analysis will start with looking at the five hypothesized connections 
presented in the theoretical framework relating to the three different kinds of 
motivations: self-affirmation, self-interest and group interest. These connections 
are aimed at developing theory on what motivates norm enforcement. 
The first two relationships presented are causal and will thus be tested. I will 
identify my expectations of finding these relationships confirmed, which is crucial 
for the hypothesis testing, since it provides me with a measure of the certainty or 
probability that I expect to find the observation confirmed by evidence, prior to 
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evidence being collected. I will go on to identify the observations related to this 
connection that could support or undermine it. I will assess the probable weight of 
these observations in order to be able to move on to the next step, the hypothesis 
testing. The hypothesis testing starts with the probability of finding evidence that 
supports the hypothesis, i.e. an assessment of the hypothesis’ certainty or 
necessity. Thereafter I will collect evidence to see whether these observations 
only can be accounted for by the theory in question or by other explanations as 
well.  
Thereafter I will turn to the following three connections and aim to place them 
on the typology of constitutive “causality” presented by Lebow and assess how 
these mechanisms affect the behaviour of the EU and Japan. When the tests and 
assessments have been made I will discuss how these relationships might be 
complementary rather than competitive, which is most likely. 
I will end by turning to the constitutive causality and the wider norm making 
norm enforcement possible for the actors to engage in. I will study this by looking 
at the human rights norm’s robustness.  
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4 Analysis 
My theoretical framework posits that norms guide social interaction and relations 
at all levels, and are both constitutive and regulative. They originate from 
previously existing social frameworks, and change within these structures. Norm 
enforcement is motivated by a combination of self-interest, group interest and 
self-affirmation, to varying degrees. Enforcement is an instrumental process as it 
controls behaviour. Underlying enforcement is however a constitutive process 
aimed at defining the mutual understandings in the community that underpin the 
actors’ identities and interests.  
I will start each of the following five sub-sections with presenting the 
hypothesized relationship. Below the first two I will also present my expectations 
of finding supporting evidence for the hypothesis. After this I will turn to actually 
presenting the evidence and observations relating to each hypothesis. I will end by 
assessing the uniqueness of this evidence, in other words, whether the observation 
is specific to this one explanation provided or whether it can be derived from 
other hypotheses as well.  
After these hypotheses tests have been carried out I will turn to assess the 
constitutive effects and the last three relationships. I will end with assessing the 
norm’s constitutive influence in general by assessing its robustness, which returns 
the focus to the constitutive process of international politics.  
4.1 Self-interest  
The theoretical framework suggests that if there are material or social benefits to 
be gained for the individual actors from sanctioning, enforcement is more likely to 
occur, and likewise that it is less likely if there are material or social costs of 
sanctioning.  
4.1.1 Material benefits 
As noted in the theoretical framework, it should be possible to observe material 
benefits for the actors themselves in order to support the causal relationship that 
material benefits increases sanctioning. If material benefits are not present, or if 
there are material costs, i.e. as a null-hypothesis, the sanctioning will not occur. 
This is summed up with that material benefits cause an actor to enforce norms 
against another.  
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This relationship is based on the expectation that states are motivated by 
material gains only, be they financial, military or power related, want to maximize 
these gains and have perfect information on how to achieve this. Based on 
empirical knowledge of the case I do not expect the EU to have any clear material 
benefits to gain from the enforcement, nor any costs. I would not expect to find 
observations confirming the relationship for the EU. Japan is an actor 
geographically closer to the DPRK and thus more affected by the country’s 
actions. Thus, I would expect that Japan do have material benefits to be gained by 
norm enforcement. Hence the probability that I will find supporting evidence is 
low for the EU, but high for Japan. 
In the statements of EU and Japan over the years in the HRC, not many 
material aspects are raised. Rather they emphasize the benefits for the DPRK 
itself to comply with the norm (Japan, 2013a, 2009). They do not discuss the extra 
economic costs of appointing the COI nor the costs of having the special 
rapporteur continuing his work year after year without ever achieving any 
substantial improvement in the country. However, a western diplomat in Geneva 
suggests that establishing a permanent COI on the DPRK was overlooked due to 
financial reasons and the doubt whether this would produce any more concrete 
results than a temporary one. Similarly some “obligatory” opposition was made 
informally due to financial reasons, but these did not seem to have clear influence 
on the outcome (Informant 1, 2015). This indicates that the material costs are 
weighed against the expected enforcement results.  
In 2014 the decision was also made to establish a “field-based structure” in 
South Korea to continue monitoring the situation (EU, 2014 b), further increasing 
the financial costs. This cost is neither anything that those states opposing the 
mandate seem to raise, despite the OHCHR having limited resources but an ever-
increasing demand for their activities. The OHCHR’s operations are mainly 
funded by voluntary contributions from states and other organizations (OHCHR, 
n.d. B). The voluntary contributions are largely from western states; Sweden, 
USA and the European Commission were the top three donors during 2013. Japan 
did not donate at all. Obviously, a new mandate does not immediately increase the 
cost of the voluntary contributors, but the contributions have increased more or 
less steadily along with the expanding undertakings of the OHCHR (OHCHR, 
2013:131, 133).  
Thus, new mandates and increased work for the OHCHR could eventually be 
causing an increase in the voluntary contributions from the EU and other actors, 
turning into sanctioning costs. In these terms it seems that the EU is materially 
invested in the issue, at least in terms of finance. This is not emphasised at all in 
their statements, but these statements being primary material aimed at a certain 
audience it is also dubious that material benefits or costs would be emphasized in 
any statements in this global council for upholding human rights. After all, human 
rights are not seen as a question of wins and losses in material aspects, but rather 
of human dignity. Thus, in the context it would be surprising to encounter clear 
references to material benefits, while it is indicated that this is an issue when 
mandates are negotiated informally.  
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Despite individual costs being present for the EU they are however the driving 
force in the enforcement of human rights in DPRK, which runs counter to the 
null-hypothesis. This undermines the hypothesized relationship on material self-
interest for EU, and the observation that the EU is financially invested in the 
enforcement might be coherent with other explanations. Due to this the 
observation’s sufficiency or uniqueness is low; the observation is not specific to 
one explanation. As noted earlier the certainty or necessity is also low, meaning 
that the first relationship so far has failed to pass a straw-in-the-wind test, which 
only slightly weakens the relationship. 
Japan is seemingly not very financially tied up to the mandate, but is however 
far more clear with one “material” benefit of sanctioning North Korea, namely the 
so called abduction issue (Japan, 2004, 2012a). Since the 1950’s many Japanese 
nationals have been abducted to the DPRK, and the Japanese government has a 
material interest in returning these individuals to their country. This is noted in 
every statement by Japan in the HRC and CHR during the studied years, making it 
a very frequent observation. Such a behaviour is however also consistent with 
theories regarding identity-affirming behaviour, granted that the Japanese identity 
in the HRC is that of a human rights promoting kind. It also seems to be one of 
the few material benefits possible to advance in the context of HRC, since it also 
applies to a human rights promoting action and preserving human dignity.  
However, the counterfactual hypothesis does not fit, since material benefits 
are present for Japan. In regards to the hypothesis test, the observation falls under 
a hoop test, with a high certainty that this observation can be confirmed with the 
observations but a low uniqueness since the observation also can be accounted for 
by other explanations as noted. The passing of a hoop test does not confirm the 
relationship but only affirms its relevance. Thus, the hypothesized relationship of 
material benefits for a self-interested actor has been weakened in the case of the 
EU while its relevance is only affirmed, not confirmed, in the case of Japan. 
However, notable is that the observations are continuous over time, so the 
frequency of the behaviour is clear, thus strengthening the evidence somewhat. 
4.1.2 Social benefits 
Social benefits and costs can also have an influence, guided by metanorms. If it is 
possible to observe social benefits for the EU and Japan by the enforcement of 
North Korea, the relationship could be true. If no such social benefits are 
observed, the enforcement should not take place. This is summed up as: “social 
benefits in a group cause an actor to enforce norms against another”. 
This relationship expects that states are motivated by social gains or losses 
when acting in this context, and that the states want to maximize the gains. For 
them to gain socially there needs to be favourable reactions to sanctioning in the 
context by other states. I expect that such reactions can come in different forms. 
The reactions opposing sanctions might be more vocal, while those states 
supporting sanctioning simply can act as co-sponsors or vote yes to the resolution. 
I would expect that the support for the resolutions on the DPRK is greater than the 
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opposition since the resolutions have been renewed every year. Thus the certainty 
is high that I can find observations confirmed for both actors. 
In order to find evidence of this I look at what kind of support the resolution 
on the DPRK has received over the time period. Generally, a resolution adopted 
by vote can be said to be characterized by conflict and controversy, while a 
resolution adopted without a vote and thus by consensus is less so. I would expect 
that states only support the resolution if it is in their interest and thus relates to 
their identity to do so, which then translates into policy and behaviour. Below is a 
table with the percentage of votes in favour, against and abstaining, rather than the 
exact numbers due to the differing number of voting members from the CHR to 
the HRC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the replacement of the CHR with the HRC lead to a direct slight decline 
in support between 2005 and 2008, the number of votes against had also declined 
during the same time period. Rather it was the number of abstaining states who 
had increased, but already the following year the resolution gained in support. The 
overall trend seems to be a continuous increasing support of the resolutions on the 
DPRK, all up to the final report of the COI in 2014 and the adoption of referring 
the DPRK to the ICC. This was a landmark resolution in ensuring accountability, 
and the first time the HRC took such a clear stance in this regard. It marked a step 
away from previous resolutions, and was also a step outside of the HRC mandate 
since they have no power to by themselves send a country to the ICC. This also 
resulted in many states asking what it meant to themselves; whether they also 
could be at risk for such a recommended referral to the ICC. It also was a risk to 
Table 2. Share of votes on resolutions on DPRK 
 Yes No Abstaining 
2003 (SR) 52.83% 18.83% 26.41% 
2004 54.71% 15.09% 30.18% 
2005 56.60% 16.98% 26.41% 
2006-2007, HRC replaces CHR, 47 voting MS instead of 53 
2008 
(Japan 
joins) 
46.80% 14.89% 38.29% 
2009 55.31% 12.76% 31.91% 
2010 59.57% 10.6% 27.65% 
2011 68.18% 6.81% 25% 
2012 Adopted without a vote  
2013 
(COI) 
Adopted without a vote  
2014 
(UNGA-
UNSC) 
63.82% 12.76% 23.40% 
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those who were actually indirectly involved in human rights abuses in the DPRK 
such as China (Informant 1, 2015).  
The result indicates a continuously larger group in support of sanctioning than 
the group strongly against it, meaning the EU and Japan can expect to receive 
social benefits from the majority supporting their sanctioning and who can view 
them as “good” actors. 
The EU and Japan frequently mentions the duty and obligation of the 
international community to respond to the situation in the DPRK, and a clear wish 
for the DPRK to increase its cooperation with the international community as well 
as to improve the human rights situation (EU, 2010, 2005b, 2003 inter alia, Japan, 
2014b, 2010 b, 2005 inter alia). As noted, actors who care about their social 
relations will enforce metanorms, which in turn have a positive effect on norm 
enforcement. If other states react to sanctioning in a positive way, the sanctioner 
will receive social benefits, and thus it increases the likelihood of sanctioning. 
This can also be established by looking at the composition of member states. The 
more “pro-sanctioning” states are voting members of at a certain point in time, the 
more sanctioning would thus be expected to be produced.  
Below is a table presenting when China, Russia, Cuba, Pakistan and 
Venezuela were members of the 53-member strong Commission of Human 
Rights, or the 47-member strong Human Rights Council starting from 2006 
(OHCHR, n.d. C, n.d. D). These states are all strong anti-sanctioning actors, 
continuously arguing against country-specific mandates. On the other hand we 
have Japan, South Korea, USA and the influential EU member states United 
Kingdom, Germany and France. These are all consistent supporters of the 
mandate against the DPRK in different ways, and are thus pro-sanctioning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Main members in the HRC/CHR 
Year Member states in the HRC/CHR 
2002 China, Russia, Cuba, Pakistan, Venezuela, UK, 
France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, USA 
2003-
2004 
China, Russia, Cuba, Pakistan, UK, France, 
Germany, Japan, South Korea, USA 
2005 China, Russia, Cuba, Pakistan, Venezuela, UK, 
France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, USA 
2006-
2009 
China, Russia, Cuba, Pakistan, UK, France, 
Germany, Japan, South Korea 
2009-
2011 
China, Russia, Cuba, Pakistan, UK, France, 
USA, Japan, South Korea 
2011-
2012 
China, Russia, Cuba, USA 
2013 Venezuela, Pakistan, Germany, Japan, South 
Korea, USA 
2014 China, Russia, Cuba, Pakistan, Venezuela, UK, 
France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, USA 
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The year 2013 is the only year when neither Cuba, China nor Russia were 
members of the council, and this is also the year when the COI was proposed and 
set up. The year 2011 which was the latest that the resolution had been put to a 
vote, these three countries where the only ones voting against the resolution. 
However, in 2012 when they were still members the resolution was nevertheless 
adopted without a vote, despite them being able to oppose it. Looking at 
metanorms, it is possible to claim that this is not a coincidence. Previous years 
when there had been a fairly equal balance between pro- and against-sanctioning 
states in the HRC/CHR, the situation of enforcement against DPRK was neither 
increased nor decreased, suggesting an equilibrium. The increased support of the 
norm over time also indicated for the anti-sanctioners that they would receive 
little to no support in their opposition, and thus higher social costs. In 2013 these 
states had no influence on the outcome, and the civil society argued that the 
composition of the council this year posed an opportunity for increased action. 
This could have been a decisive factor causing the enforcement to happen at that 
certain point in time (Informant 1, 2015). Thus, EU and Japan could expect more 
positive reactions to sanctioning, and chose to increase their sanctioning efforts. 
They could thus receive benefits in the form of positive reactions from other states 
in the council, viewing them as “good types” as Horne puts it (2007:148). They 
sanction harmful behaviour in order to elicit positive reactions from other actors.  
These observations of references to the duty of the international community, 
as well as the composition of the council and the increased support of the 
resolutions against the DPRK, all support the hypothesis in some way. While 
these observations are frequent and seemingly non-spurious, it seems possible that 
other explanations also could account for them, meaning that these have a low 
uniqueness. However, I assessed the certainty to be rather high and thus the 
hypothesis passes a hoop test, affirming the relevance of the hypothesis.  
In sum, the self-interest component is relatively consistent during the whole 
time period. The component seems to have affected the motivations of the EU and 
Japan to sanction to some extent, indicating that they act by a logic of 
consequence, aiming at getting what they want. This seems true for Japan more so 
than the EU since the material self-interest of EU seems to contradict its actions of 
enforcement. However, being financially tied up to something still indicates an 
actor’s intent, which leads me to the next issue of identity-affirmation and group 
interest. 
4.2 Self-affirmation and group interest 
In this section I will turn to self-affirmation and group interest. The theoretical 
framework suggests that norms underpin the identity, behaviour and interests of 
actors, and hence the enforcement of the norm will also “enforce” or affirm the 
actors’ own identity, behaviour and interest, as well as identity, behaviour and 
interest of a larger community or group of actors. I will examine how community 
membership, reputation and discourse motivate the actors to enforce of norms, 
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and how this norm constitutes their identity and makes it possible for them to 
enforce the norm. 
4.2.1 Community and identity 
If I can observe that the EU and Japan are members of groupings encouraging 
sanctioning of human rights violators, this can support the hypothesized 
relationship that identity-affirming membership guides the interest of actors to 
enforce norms. If they are members of groupings that do not encourage 
sanctioning of human rights violators, sanctioning should not occur. This is 
summed up as “group membership causes an actor to want to enforce norms 
against another”. 
This relationship expects that the socio-historical context and community 
membership of a state will affect it to act in relation to the community standards. 
These standards provide meaning to behaviour and socialize actors through 
identity constraint and affirmation. Essentially, it is an issue of identifying 
whether there are communities whose shared values the two actors are motivated 
by. Within the EU the socio-historical context has an emphasis on human rights 
and liberal democracy since this is essential when a state wants to join the EU, 
which means that I expect to find observations supporting this hypothesis. In 
Japan such context is not as present as with the EU, but it being a democracy I 
would still expect the country to align itself with communities supporting human 
rights. Looking at the known outcome, that both actors have been driving forces 
behind the enforcement against North Korea, I would definitely expect them both 
to be part of a grouping in the HRC where human rights protection is central.  
The EU thus in itself a quite distinct community and they often vote distinctly 
from other MS in the HRC (Hug & Lukács, 2014). However, the EU consists of 
member states in itself, each and one of them also belonging to different 
subsystemic communities. For example, some of the EU-MS belong to the 
Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in the UN, while some belong to 
the Eastern European group. These regional groups are central in many ways in 
the UN, among them membership allocations on the HRC and serving as 
negotiation and cooperation forums. However, it can be argued that the EU has an 
identity distinct from their interests and behaviour, since they act collectively and 
has common foundational principles. The below quote is from the Treaty of 
Lisbon and sets out the founding values of the EU.  
 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member 
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.  
(Treaty of Lisbon, Article 1a) 
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Below is another quote regarding the EU’s relation to the rest of the world; its 
agenda and values to be promoted towards other states. 
 
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values 
and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to 
peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual 
respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection 
of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict 
observance and the development of international law, including respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter.  
(Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2:5) 
 
One can note that respect for and protection of human rights are part of these 
foundational principles of the EU, including rule of law. The EU Lisbon treaty 
was adopted in 2007, thus possibly only directly influencing the decisions made 
thereafter, such as the appointment of the COI. These principles were however 
also included in previous agreements ranging at least from 2004 (EU, n.d.), but 
still does not cover all the time to 2002 when the EU first mentioned its concern 
over the situation in the DPRK (EU, 2003).  
The foundational principles for the EU membership have thus varied over 
time, but the variation has been a strengthening of the values rather than a decline. 
It is possible to outline the current values as motivations for the EU to act in order 
to promote its own principles. This could possibly be even more important for 
such a heterogenic actor such as the EU, since it would bring together the 
respective member states more when cohesion in the group is emphasised. It sets a 
context where the interests of the EU are clearly defined, providing meaning to 
human rights enforcing behaviour as an act of upholding the identity of the EU. It 
also sets the community standards within the EU, indicating how far the 
behaviour of the EU MS can diverge from the shared norms.  
One could also account for these values and principles as a way to gain 
material benefits through trade and positive diplomatic relations, both between 
states within the EU and also with other states. But they were part of a 
“constitution” aimed at uniting the EU’s member states even further, and are thus 
a strong indication of shared values among the MS’s governments. These values 
could be a result of a spurious relationship, where the interest to enforce norms 
against other states in the DPRK results in a need to promote oneself as a human 
rights “defender”, or else risk being called a hypocrite. This risk still withstands 
regardless since no EU MS fully respect human rights today. In this observation 
the EU appeal to the human rights norm. In other words they don’t try to sell why 
respect for human rights is good, nor do they take it for granted and act within the 
norm without referencing it. When an actor appeals to a norm, as in this case, they 
are situated within a middle range constitutive effect. This indicates that the EU’s 
identity is partly based on human rights promotion and protection, making it more 
likely that they will act in a human rights respecting way than a human rights 
violating way.  
  31 
Japan is a member of the Asian Pacific regional group, but also JUSCANZ, a 
group comprising of all non-EU members of the WEOG plus South Korea and 
Japan. This group do not aim to coordinate common standpoints but is rather a 
platform for information exchange, but serve to promote the interests of its 
members (Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN Office and to the other 
international organisations in Geneva, 2014). Multilateral institutions in East Asia 
are manifold, but Black notes that much regional interaction are built upon 
microregional connections, such as business ties and similar. In this network 
environment, the main characteristics of the normative context are consensus 
building, non-intervention, non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes and 
regional solutions to regional problems. This softer institutionalism is based on 
socialisation where identities are reformed and interests recalculated (2014:23-
24). Lim and Vreeland finds that such a “consensus” might in the case of the 
UNSC be a result of Japanese leverage through aid to other Asian countries, since 
few of these have voted against Japanese standpoints at a total of 274 UNSC 
resolutions. Especially Philippines, Nepal and South Korea voted with Japan 100 
percent of the time, but this pattern could also be attributed to shared regional 
interests (Lim & Vreeland, 2013:65). Such a regional identity or regional interest 
is not observed in the Japanese statements of the HRC/CHR.  
Rather, one can note that both Japan and EU attribute themselves to belong to 
a community of staunch supporters of country mandates in the HRC. That such a 
group exists has been established under the section regarding social benefits. This 
group is identifiable through their shared values and interest, as shown through 
their support of the SR mandate for the last decade. This thus include the states 
supporting country mandates, but also different UN bodies and mandates, 
including the High Commissioner for human rights and the SR and COI for 
DPRK. That there is a common ground for these actors is for example expressed 
in Japan’s statement in 2014 when they regretted the DPRK’s uncooperative 
stance since they showed a total disregard for the HRC’s activities (Japan, 2014a). 
Similarly, Japan have asked the COI how the international community can support 
its activities (2013a), and that the resolutions in 2012 adopted by consensus in 
both UNGA and HRC was the collective result of work done by the SR and the 
international community, which was “distressed” by the human rights situation in 
the DPRK. By the continuous spending of resources on nuclear weapons and 
missiles, Japan argued that the DPRK continued to provoke the international 
community (2013b). This indicates that Japan sees it as belonging to the 
“international community” as defined in the HRC, which is a community with the 
aim to protect and promote human rights.  
Both the EU and Japan referred to the SR’s recommendations to appoint a 
COI, strongly supported by the High Commissioner for human rights, when 
suggesting so in their resolution in 2013 (Japan, 2013b, EU, 2013b). As noted, the 
calls for increased cooperation with the international community has been a 
consistent ingredient for all years, and already in 2005 the EU asked the newly 
appointed SR how one could persuade the DPRK government that the presence of 
UN agencies, humanitarian organizations and NGOs was proof that the 
international community “was truly concerned about the North Korean 
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population” (EU, 2005a). During the first cycle of the Universal Periodic Review 
the DPRK did not accept any recommendations made to them. It was time for 
their second cycle in 2014 in the UPR, and beforehand the EU encouraged the 
“DPRK’s new leadership to use its next universal periodic review in 2014 as an 
opportunity to enhance its dialogue with the international community” (EU, 
2012).  
This clear connection to UN officials and bodies, where the EU and Japan 
state their interests and wishes in relation to the SR reports and actions, whereas 
other states opposing the mandate do not, is also an indication for the wish for EU 
and Japan to show their alignment with the values of the HRC and the UN. For 
example every statement by the EU at the interactive dialogues with the SR or 
COI in the HRC has commenced with them thanking the mandate-holder for the 
report submitted, the SR’s/COI’s efforts and similar. Japan similarly “pays 
tribute” to the COI (Japan, 2014a), “appreciates the dedicated efforts” of the COI 
and SR (Japan, 2013 a, 2013 b, 2009), and “commends” the activities of the SR 
(Japan, 2011, 2010 a). In 2010 Japan believed that “the Special Rapporteur’s 
reports are objective, well-balanced and thus, highly credible” (Japan, 2010a). 
This started only when Japan decided to co-table the resolution with the EU, 
indicating that the wish to adhere to the community standards is stronger when a 
state is invested in it more as a proposer of a resolution.  
The civil society also strongly supported the COI mandate and pushed for 
increased action towards the DPRK, and was also thanked in several statements 
(Informant 1, 2015, EU, 2014b, 2013b). In combination to Japan and the EU’s 
staunch appeal to the DPRK to cooperate with the international community, it is 
possible to map out a clear motivation for the two actors to act in accordance with 
the community standards. These community standards or underlying norm can be 
defined by looking at how the UN human rights bodies are presented. The HRC is 
the “inter-governmental body within the United Nations system responsible for 
strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and 
for addressing situations of human rights violations and make recommendations 
on them” (OHCHR, n.d. A). The OHCHR in turn ”represents the world's 
commitment to universal ideals of human dignity”, and “have a unique mandate 
from the international community to promote and protect all human rights”, 
according to themselves (OHCHR, n.d. E). These basic descriptions at the 
OHCHR website echoes that of the statements by the EU and Japan, who also 
emphasize shared global cooperation and improvement of human rights as put 
forward in the resolutions, and also illustrated by the question posed by the EU to 
the COI at the 25
th
 HRC session in 2014: “What […] would be the most effective 
means to address the ongoing violations of human rights in the DPRK, and how 
may the International Community best respond?” (EU, 2014a). In other words, 
how to improve the human rights situation and how to make the DPRK 
government and the international community to interact more? 
By non-compliance with these community standards, the actors risk to be 
constrained themselves by being subjected to enforcement. Through compliance 
with the community standards, the identity of the actors as members of the 
community is instead affirmed. This is attributed to the context of the HRC and 
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the UN, which give a positive meaning to human rights protecting behaviour since 
it is enshrined in the UN charter and the HRC’s main objective.  
Members of this community are in some sense all the UN member states, 
since they all have a possibility to affect the underpinning standards of the 
community. The debate regarding the enforcement towards DPRK has also been 
continuous, meaning that a unified view of the international community is non-
existent. However, a majority of the international community, i.e. UN member 
states and bodies, have had a shared view of the benefits of sanctioning the DPRK 
since it has passed through voting for many years. Japan and EU want to be seen 
as compliant community members in this context, and in such a context, it is 
reasonable for them to sanction a state being continuously and defensively 
uncooperative with the UN and committing grave violations of human rights such 
as the DPRK, and thus affirm the identity of themselves. As discussed in relation 
to metanorms, such an interest to sanction those being non-compliant with the 
overall norm will likely be stronger when the HRC membership composition 
contains more members belonging to this grouping and norm, thus making 2013 a 
year when this notion could have held especially large leverage to translate into 
action.  
The frequent mentioning of the “international community” and UN mandate-
holders do indicate a clear emphasis on the importance of these institutions, as 
well as a notion that all states must respect these shared institutions. A lack of 
such respect indicates a lack of respect to all states in the international 
community, thus also meaning a lack of predictability in bilateral relations to the 
DPRK, which could be especially influential for Japan. By acting in accordance 
with the HRC’s shared values, the EU and Japan affirms their identity as part of 
the community and protectors of human rights when they enforce the shared 
values towards another state. They appeal to the shared values of human rights, 
aiming to give these values a more taken-for-granted quality.  
In sum, the connection that membership will cause states to act in identity- 
and self-affirming ways seems to find affirmation in the observations in terms of a 
middle-range constitutive effect. This means that the group membership of the 
HRC makes it more likely that the EU and Japan will act in accordance with the 
group’s shared values. This behaviour can be accounted for by other identities or 
explanations as well, where the actors are more motivated by benefits and social 
and material gains. However the EU has stronger ties to values relating to human 
rights protection and international cooperation, also observable in the fact that the 
EU was the lone initiator of the sanctioning against the DPRK in 2003, all up to 
2008 when Japan decided to co-table the resolution, as well as the EU always 
being the one to introduce the resolutions and the first to speak of the two 
sanctioners. 
4.2.2 Communication and reputation 
In this section I will aim at finding observations supporting the relationship 
regarding reputation. If reputation guides the interest of actors to enforce norms, 
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Japan and the EU should be able to be observed to act and communicate in ways 
to enhance their reputation (in relation to the guiding norm in the context). If they 
do not act and communicate to enhance their reputation in relation to the 
dominant norm, there should subsequently be no enforcement. This is summed up 
as “the wish to enhance reputation causes an actor to enforce norms against 
another”.  
This is based on an expectation that by means of actions and statements an 
actor tries to enhance its relations with others in the community. This happens by 
the actor trying to be associated with the community’s shared values, i.e. they try 
to relate to the community and its shared values. Do they follow or break the 
community standards? Since I believe that the community influencing their 
decision is the HRC, I expect that both actors support the community values and 
act and communicate in association with these values of human rights.  
Klotz notes that self-affirmation based on the prevailing norms is not only 
observable in behaviour, i.e. sanctioning, but also in the process of 
communication, i.e. statements. This can be analysed by identifying how norms 
take form as justifications, i.e. intentionality and acceptability of the norm rather 
than compliance and deviance (1995:30). To communicate in ways to affect their 
own specific reputation is a way for states to act in a self-affirming way.  
As already noted, the norm underpinning the HRC is human rights, and Japan 
and the EU do have an observed intent to portray themselves as compliant to and 
protectors of the norm. Desired traits in a human rights-based international 
community should be enhancing human rights globally. The interest for the actor 
to convey such traits lies in self-affirmation and minimizing negative 
repercussions of community criticisms; by portraying themselves as human rights 
protectors they might minimize the possible constraint by themselves being 
sanctioned by other states. After all, no state complies with human rights fully in 
any sense, and by adhering to values promoted by a shared community the EU 
and Japan can minimize the risk of themselves being tarnished with the 
constraining effects of a bad reputation and sanctioning. 
But how can this motivation be observed more concretely in the statements 
and by their actions in the HRC/CHR? This goes back to the issue of how the 
norm is related to the actors’ justifications and actions, and their intentions and 
acceptance related to the norm. 
Firstly, the action to enforce the human rights norm in the DPRK does show 
acceptance of the norm as both constitutive and regulative of states’ behaviour, 
since the EU and Japan act in accordance to the norm. These actions have been 
continuing from 2003 up to 2014 and have escalated in force somewhat 
throughout, when the final report of the COI and the consequent resolution 
adopted by the HRC was aimed at ensuring accountability for the responsible 
actors in the DPRK (EU, 2014a). Ensuring accountability is of course a far 
stronger action than simply investigating possible crimes.  
In the statements there are also clear indications of an acceptance of the 
prevailing norm and justification of the action to enforce it (the markings and 
enhancements in the following quotes are all my own). The choice to in 2003 to 
draft the first resolution on the DPRK by the EU was in order to “draw 
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international attention to the human rights and humanitarian situation in that 
country”, and that it could help the DPRK “to improve its human rights situation 
and to cooperate more closely with the international community in general, and 
the High Commissioner in particular” (EU, 2003). In 2004, when the SR mandate 
was set up, the EU stated that it was in order to “investigate how the Government 
was complying with its obligations under international human rights instruments” 
(EU, 2004).  
In 2008 when Japan decided to join the EU and co-table the resolution they 
suggested it was because the human rights situation in the DPRK “remains serious 
enough to be followed by the international community” (Japan, 2008). This 
statement is hardly much stronger than earlier statements from the EU, but the aim 
to enforce human rights in the DPRK had gained another strong supporter. In 
2013 at the adoption of the resolution on the appointment of the COI the EU 
stated that for “too long, the population has been subjected to wide and systematic 
human rights violations and abuses. For too long the Government of the DPRK 
has persistently refused to cooperate with the Human Rights Council and its 
Special Rapporteur” (EU, 2013b). In the same statement the EU stated that the EU 
and Japan had not taken the step to appoint the COI lightly. They echoed their 
first statement in 2003, noting that the HRC and its predecessor for many years 
had been urging the DPRK to improve the human rights situation of its people and 
to cooperate with UN mechanisms. Regrettably, the EU stated, these calls had 
gone unheeded (EU, 2013b). Japan similarly stated in the individual dialogue with 
the SR at the same session a hope that the resolution would gain broad support 
and send “a strong message to the DPRK and lead to the improvement of the 
DPRK human rights situation through a more effective investigation” (Japan, 
2013b).  
These quotes show a clear intention to accept and support the human rights 
norm underpinning the community, as well as a wish that all states should 
cooperate with and be involved in the international community. Investigation and 
a hope for improvement of the human rights situation are two ingredients found 
both in the Japanese statement in 2013 and in the EU statements in 2003 and 
2004, and cooperation with the international community is similarly a recurring 
theme. This communication process, to reiterate similar requests over time related 
to the norm, shows how the EU and Japan wishes to be evaluated through and 
associated with the community’s shared values. By associating themselves with 
these values they show that they are socialized into the values, and also legitimize 
the values by their actions. In this way the EU and Japan successfully enhances 
their relationship with the community by defining that they, as actors, matter. This 
lies in their interest since it minimizes their own vulnerability for the constraining 
effects of the identity as human rights deviants.  
These observations suggest a middle-range constitution, with frequent appeals 
to the human rights norm rather than attempts to sell the human rights norm. Of 
course, conveying oneself as a human rights promoter in a context where human 
rights promotion is a fundamental norm, could also be a result of a wish to gain 
material or social benefits, but in combination with the previous observations it 
seems to indicate that the identity underlying the behaviour of the EU and Japan, 
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making it possible for them to enforce human rights, is human rights protection 
and promotion.  
The third and fourth hypothesized relationships were the two relating to self-
affirming motivations, and both of these are affirmed as having middle-range 
constitutive effects on the norm enforcement. For the EU we find more support 
for the relationship than for Japan, indicating that the EU is more motivated by 
self-affirmation in terms of the logic of appropriateness. They thus act in relation 
to what they are “supposed” to do, aligning themselves with duty and obligation 
rather than self-interest and gain. Japan seems more motivated by reasons of self-
interest, following the logic of consequences.  
4.2.3 Discourse and institutions  
The shared human rights norm underlies dominant ideas in the HRC. Through 
social interaction a shared, intersubjective community conception of normality 
and deviance is developed (Klotz, 1995:32). I would want to trace the 
permeability of the discourse of human rights in the UN over the time period of 
interest, in order to establish if the underlying norm of enforcing human rights is 
also in the interest of the larger majority in the community. If it is so, enforcement 
against deviant members in the community can be expected to occur more 
frequently. This is summed up as “shared norms in the community cause actors to 
enforce norms against another”.  
This relationship concerns group interest rather than self-affirmation, and 
expects that if the discourse of human rights protection has permeated into the 
community it will also lie in their interest to enforce human rights against deviant 
states. Since the resolutions against North Korea has been voted through year after 
year in the HRC, I would expect to find that at least a majority of the states share 
this interpretation of the empirical world. Looking back at table 2 and 3 the norm 
of human rights has affected the decision-making process in the HRC and gained 
increased support over time. It is possible to note that it seems to be a 
strengthened shared conception in the HRC of normality, being human rights 
compliance, and deviance, being human rights violations.  
Similar wordings are often used in the statements. In 2002 the EU expressed 
concern about the “extensive, continued and serious violations of human rights” in 
the DPRK (EU, 2003). In 2003, the EU expressed “deep concern about reports of 
systematic, widespread and rave violations of human rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea”. In 2004, it was “deeply concerned about continuing 
reports of systematic, widespread and grave violations” in the DPRK. The same, 
or very similar versions of this formulation, can be found in the EU voting 
statements from 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, Japanese voting 
statements from 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2014, and Japanese statements at the 
interactive dialogues in 2009 and 2011. Notably, some years are exceptions, but 
other years the formulation is used by both actors at the voting and the interactive 
dialogues. In other words, there is a clear shared notion of the situation in the 
DPRK between the EU and Japan. These formulations can also be found in the 
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resolution adopted on the DPRK, and thus guiding in the mandate of both the COI 
and the SR on DPRK. Clear is however how Japan only used these formulations 
since 2009, one year after they decided to co-table the resolution, while the EU 
used these formulations in 2002, one year before they tabled the first resolution on 
the DPRK. The EU was early with discussing the DPRK in these terms, and 
likewise early with discussing accountability and the possibility to refer the 
DPRK to the ICC (EU, 2011a, 2010). As such they seem to even be the initiators 
of this shared notion on the DPRK specifically, and aids in creating consistent 
empirical interpretations of the world in the HRC.  
To investigate human rights, to urge cooperation with the international 
community and to encourage improvements of human rights, are the norms I have 
already established as fundamental in this process. These are included in all 
resolutions and seem to have continuously gained momentum and support by the 
international community as shown by the voting results for each year, save for the 
institutional change occurred in 2006-2007 which might have affected the support 
in other ways. A trend can however be distinguished: more support and less 
opposition for the UN human rights enforcement against the DPRK. That is, up 
until it started to involve new norms; norms about accountability and impunity, 
making sure the responsible people were punished more than in terms of their 
reputation. Such a norm did still find fairly large support, but was obviously more 
questioned than previous years when the resolutions had been adopted by 
consensus, and clearly differed from the previous shared assumption about human 
rights promotion. This trend still indicates that the discourse of human rights 
promotion garnered more and more support over time, increasing its permeability 
into the institution.  
This observation is based on primary evidence in the form of voting results 
and official statements, but also secondary evidence in the form of an interview 
with a diplomat in Geneva. While the latter is an interpretation of the happenings 
in 2014, it does align with what the theory would expect us to observe. A new 
norm is always going to be more contended than an older one, but there seems to 
be quite a distinct trend of the norm of human rights permeating more and more in 
the institutional context, thus affecting the group’s interest to enforce the norm 
more against states that deviate from it. To stop enforce the norm towards the 
DPRK in such a context when it continuously gains more support would be 
almost inconceivable, since the social momentum behind it creates a large 
incentive for the EU and Japan to continue. Only if they changed with identifying 
as part of the community and did not wish to adhere to the community’s values 
would it be conceivable for them to stop. This does not indicate that the norm of 
human rights protection has gained a taken-for-granted quality however, since it is 
still contended and more so when accountability was involved in the picture. Yet 
again these observations suggest a middle-range constitutive effect on behaviour. 
Thus group interest seems to be a factor in the context motivating the actors’ 
behaviour as well.  
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4.3 Complementary analysis  
No hypothesized relationship has here been eliminated, but all have a varying 
degree of leverage. By studying each separately it has been possible to find their 
individual influence on the outcome, but they most likely interact to cause the 
outcome of norm enforcement. The one relationship differing mostly from the 
others is the one concerning material benefits. The remaining four hypotheses all 
concerns social and group relations in different ways.  
The connection relating to community sets out that the main community, 
which the EU and Japan act in relation to, is the one that provides the context of 
the norm enforcement, namely the Human Rights Council. This community is 
based upon human rights protection and promotion, meaning that by aspiring to 
protect and promote human rights an actor can affirm its identity as a member of 
the community and act “appropriately”. The EU has in itself a community 
membership where a membership requirement is human rights compliance for 
each respective MS. This indicates that the interest and identity of the EU is 
strongly connected to an agenda of human rights compliance. Japan is less so, but 
clearly aligns with the EU position as a member of the community since they have 
chosen to act jointly with them. This strong connection to the foundational 
principles of human rights might suggest why the EU is one of the main financial 
donors to the OHCHR, despite this providing a certain material cost for them. 
However, for Japan the motivation seems to stem in a very large part from their 
material interest in repatriating their citizens, an issue which seems very big and 
alive for the country (Informant 1, 2015).  
The relationship concerning how the actors relate to the community and its 
shared values by aiming to communicate a certain reputation is directly related to 
the third relationship and the community’s shared values identified in it. Through 
the support of the resolutions against the DPRK and the proposal to increase 
action against the country, the EU and Japan show that they as actors matter in the 
HRC, and thus increase their power leverage towards other states. When they get 
associated with the human rights framework in the HRC they emphasize desirable 
traits in the community, and affirm their identity as members of the community 
and avoid the possible constraining effects. 
This relates to the second hypothesized relationship, which sets out possible 
social benefits as motivating the norm enforcement behaviour. A good reputation 
is such a social benefit, since it minimizes constraining effects of the community 
membership. Instead it provides the actors with an image of good types in the 
community. In the first hypothesis I also established that despite material costs the 
EU enforce human rights, and that Japan’s material interest is also consistent with 
the norm of protecting human rights. Thus, even these observations are aligning 
themselves with the explanation relating to the norm’s influence.  
The fifth relationship shows that these shared norms have gained increased 
support among the larger group, and indicate that mainly the EU has set this trend. 
The norm was up until 2013 only containing human rights protection and 
promotion, but in 2014 a new concept was introduced regarding accountability. 
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This was however met with more contending perspectives, and thus seems to not 
be completely robust yet. However, Klotz notes how one way for this shared 
community conception to influence the determination of national interests and 
political goals, namely multilateral institutional membership. Thus this also 
relates back to the second and third relationships concerning the membership 
composition in the council, which enables this shared norm to influence domestic 
political goals for the EU and Japan. 
To sum it up, notions of duty and obligation to enforce human rights seems to 
govern this political behaviour, more so than self-interest and gain. Together these 
five hypothesized relationships seem to provide a sufficient cause for the 
outcome, meaning that these observations suggest that few other explanations 
would account for the outcome. While the first two relationships provide an 
agential perspective, arguing that states act in accordance of their preferences, the 
last three put an emphasis on how structures define these preferences and 
behaviours. But the structures were initially set up by actors, meaning that they 
complement each other. Looking at the constitutive components of the norm, 
which strongly underlies this outcome, strengthens this argument further.  
4.4 Constitution of the norm 
The main cause bringing about the effect of EU and Japan enforcing human rights 
against North Korea is the norm of human rights in itself. This means that the 
norm guiding the behaviour, identity and interests of the states is that of human 
rights, and this norm underpins self-affirmation and group interest, as well as to a 
certain extent self-interest.  
This norm of human rights guides social interaction and relations in the 
community of the HRC. It provides the HRC with a shared understanding of 
standards of behaviour, and makes enforcement possible. The human rights norm 
thus plays both a constitutive and regulative role, by providing members of the 
community with an identity, which makes enforcement possible as a means to 
affirm their identity as members and fulfilling their “duty”. At the same time this 
norm also regulates actors behaviour since non-compliance will be met with 
enforcement, and encourages enforcement towards others. But how is this 
possible, and why does the influence of a norm vary?  
This goes back to the issue of the norm’s robustness. As noted, since norms 
come in varying strengths rather than just exist or not, the constitutive and 
regulative roles of norms will be stronger if the norm is more robust (Legro, 
1997:31, 33). This is assessed by looking at the specificity, durability and 
concordance of the norm.  
The human rights norm’s specificity is assessed as high. The norm’s 
prohibitions are declared in the UDHR (Universal Declaration for Human Rights) 
and its related conventions, which also entail a number of obligations for the 
states. In the statements relating to the DPRK, the EU and Japan continuously 
refer to different types of violations of these rights enshrined in the norm, as for 
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example violations against the freedom of expression (EU, 2013a, Japan, 2011), 
enforced disappearances/abductions (EU, 2013a, Japan, 2009), non-refoulement 
(EU, 2012, 2014a), torture (EU, 2013a, Japan, 2010), arbitrary detention (EU, 
2014a), right to life (EU, 2013a), slave labour (EU, 2010), and the right to food 
(EU, 2011a, Japan, 2011). More examples can be drawn from the statements, thus 
indicating that the actors have a clear understanding of the restrictions the norm 
poses on behaviour.  
The durability of the human rights norm also seems to be relatively high, but 
not as unambiguously as the specificity. The UDHR was adopted in 1948, and the 
Commission of Human Rights was established in 1946. However, until 1973 
international human rights treaties had not entered into force, and the strength of 
international human rights norms and institutions was much weaker. Explicit 
bilateral human rights policies had not been adopted by any country and fewer 
human rights NGOs existed. Human rights violations in states such as South 
Africa and Chile started to be noticed during this time, and contributed during the 
following years to a strengthening of the networks and the emergence of human 
rights foreign policies. From 1973 to 1985, transnational human rights NGOs and 
advocacy networks started to expand, and international social structures of human 
rights norms and institutions were being built by states and networks. After 1985 
an international “norms cascade” began in the world according to Risse and 
Sikkink, as the influence of human rights norms spread rapidly (1999:21-22). 
However, durability also concerns how challenges to the norm’s prohibitions 
are tackled, and whether norm enforcement occurs. This is obviously not the case. 
As Human Rights Watch illustrates at their website for the HRC, the HRC has a 
clear selectivity in their norm enforcement against states, which is only noted by 
states when they wish the council to address fewer situations. Consequently, mass 
surveillance, crackdowns on civil society in China and Egypt, arbitrary detention 
at Guantanamo Bay, the human rights situation in Russia and Uzbekistan are just 
a few examples of situations that are not addressed by the HRC. Double standards 
prevail according to HRW, noting that China, Cuba and Russia rejected all 
country resolutions put to a vote apart from each resolution addressing the Israel-
Palestine topic. On the other side is the US which consistently supports HRC’s 
engagement on many country situations but who continuously rejects actions 
against Israel (Votes Count, n.d. B). Thus, norm enforcement reinforces and 
reproduces the human rights norm, but occurs only at some situations. No state 
took the situation in the DPRK in defence (Informant 1, 2015), so perhaps the 
graveness of this specific situation was indeed decisive for the increased action. 
Concordance lastly revolves around how widely accepted the rules of the 
norm are in diplomatic discussions and treaties. In other words, this is an issue of 
whether there is an intersubjective agreement on the norm, but reaffirmations do 
not need to indicate robustness. With the norm of human rights there is as 
mentioned several treaties and documents laying clear the rules, indicating a 
higher concordance. However, as noted there is also a widespread selectivity and 
double standard among the states. However not even the DPRK rejects human 
rights in their statements to the HRC. At the 25
th
 session of the HRC, the DPRK 
completely rejected all actions taken against them, but that they should continue 
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to “strongly defend our socialist system which was chosen by our people and is 
the cradle of life and happiness and to make further efforts to faithfully fulfil our 
obligations in the international area of human rights” (DPRK, 2014). Cuba, a stark 
opponent against country mandates, argued that “selective mandates” had nothing 
to do with “genuine concern for the human rights situation in the country 
concerned”, and that the HRC should not deny the people of the DPRK their right 
to peace, self-determination and development (Cuba, 2014). Thus, even those 
states that might not be the strongest protectors of human rights do not reject the 
norm completely. However, they do put special interpretations and conditions on 
their acceptance of the norm, suggesting that the concordance of the norm is not 
as high as it could be.  
I have thus found a high specificity, a medium durability and medium 
concordance, which suggests that the norm of human rights should have some 
impact on the behaviour of states in the community of the HRC, but most likely 
vary in strength depending on the actor, time and issue. This relates to where in 
the norm life cycle the human rights norm is situated. When a norm has reached 
the last stage it is taken for granted and not debated on a wide scale. The human 
rights norm seems to be far from this stage, since socialization, demonstration and 
institutionalization are prevailing in the HRC, and there is an aim (for some) to 
make norm breakers start following the norm. This indicates a middle-range 
strength in effects of the norm’s constitution, since it makes some behaviour more 
like and other behaviour less likely. However other identities are also possible to 
affect the actors’ behaviour in this context.  
Consequently, this implies that the norm is the underlying variable influencing 
and constituting the actor’s motivations to some extent in a constitutive process, 
since the norm defines the actors’ identities and interests. These motivations (self-
affirmation, self-interest and group interest) generate an instrumental process of 
enforcing norm-violating behaviour. Thus, states seem to enforce norms against 
other states because it lies in their interest to do so, and this interest is dependent 
on the relative strength of the norm. The human rights norm is relatively strong 
but only in its second stage of the norm cascade, and thus affects actors’ 
behaviour in terms of affirmation of identity and constraint of behaviour. In the 
second stage norm enforcement is more likely to occur than in earlier or later 
stages since the enforcement is part of socialization, a central mechanism in the 
norm cascade.  
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5 Conclusions 
At the outset of this thesis I asked: “Why do states enforce norms against other 
states, and how is this possible?”. My purpose was to develop a pluralistic 
theoretical framework to understand and explain international norm development 
and enforcement, and thus provide new insight into what governs states’ interests 
to enforce norms. 
I have shown, through process-tracing, indications that if the norm is more 
robust, more norm enforcement will occur by actors who identify as compliant 
with the norm. The human rights norm encourages states to fulfil their “duty” by 
addressing human rights violations and crimes against humanity, as expressed by 
the COI chair Michael Kirby. If the human rights norm would not have had a 
relatively high robustness, the EU and Japan would have less motivation to 
enforce human rights in the DPRK, because this would have led to fewer social 
benefits and possibilities for identity-affirmation. Since the human rights norm is 
situated in a norm cascade, which has been on-going for several decades, it is still 
not completely socialized into all states’ identities and behaviour. By enforcing 
the norm, the EU and Japan strengthens it and affirms their identity as part of the 
community promoting human rights. 
The EU and Japan has over time been generally consistently motivated by the 
same incentives, although a strengthening over time is indicated. This due to the 
EU’s introduction of the issue of demanding accountability in later years, and 
Japan in 2008 deciding to co-table the resolutions on the DPRK with the EU. 
Only then did Japan start to talk in more demanding terms towards the DPRK, 
previously mainly discussing the abductions. After 2008, Japan has continued to 
discuss the abductions, but also noting other human rights abuses. The EU is 
strongly motivated by promoting the norm, and has set a standard by demanding 
accountability and not only turning to “naming and shaming”. Thus, despite the 
consistent view of states as self-interested, a shared norm such as human rights 
can influence states to act in accordance with the norm and thus affirm their own 
identity as part of the community. 
The limitations of this pluralistic approach is for one found in the empirical 
material. Genuine “proof” of state actors’ motivations are always going to be hard 
to obtain, and the statements used in this thesis has been interpreted from the 
theoretical framework rather than providing with clear-cut evidence. Some 
inferences are thus based on shakier grounds than I would have preferred. The 
conclusions however provide an affirmation of the theoretical framework and 
suggest its explanatory power. 
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5.1 Further research 
In her book, Martha Finnemore utilizes sociological institutionalist insights to 
demonstrate the influence of norms on state behaviour, by examining ways in 
which international organizations socialize states to accept new political goals and 
new values that have lasting impacts (1996:3). Such an approach could also be 
fruitful to study the case from, but would require different data than was available 
for this study, for example in the form of interviews with individuals present or 
other ways to get an insight into the discussions and negotiations that have been 
held behind closed doors.  
Further research should also include a closer studying of all states in the HRC 
and their statements relating to the issue of norm enforcement over time. 
Comparisons could also be made across different institutions to see whether other 
mechanisms influence the actors’ motivations to enforce norms. Further 
development of especially the rationalist-materialistic theory could also contribute 
to further study the dynamic between instrumental interest and identity-
affirmation. 
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